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Firm Choice Of Discount Rate Used 
In Valuing Pension Obligations 




This paper examines how the minimum liability reporting requirement for defined benefit pension 
plans affects the choice of actuarial assumptions. There is a long history of accounting literature 
which suggests that firms select accounting practices in order to artificially improve the appearance 
of their operations.  Similarly, there is a history of research regarding the question of how firms 
select the actuarial assumptions used in accounting for their defined benefit pension plans.  This 
paper makes a unique contribution to this line of research in that it explicitly examines and focuses 
on the effect of the “minimum liability” requirement under Statement of Financial Accounting 





he two basic variants of pension plans are the “defined contribution plan” and the “defined benefit 
plan”.  Under a defined contribution plan, the amount which the firm contributes to the pension plan is 
defined by the terms of the employment contract (e.g., 5% of an employees pre-tax salary).  Once that 
required payment has been made, the employer has no further liability.  In contrast, under a defined benefit plan the 
retiree is guaranteed a specified (or defined) benefit after retirement.  The employer is required to fund the pension 
plan to whatever extent is necessary to guarantee that the funds are available to pay benefits when due. 
 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No.  87 “Employer Accounting for Pensions” (SFAS 87) was 
released in 1985.  This statement established generally accepted accounting principles in accounting for defined 
benefit pension plans.  Under SFAS 87, firms are required to make several assumptions as part of their accounting 
procedures. 
 
The accounting problem in defined benefit pension plans is essentially one of estimation.  Beyond the 
actuarial estimates regarding employee turnover and mortality, the firm must estimate the expected rate of return on 
pension plan assets, the expected rate of salary growth (assuming that pension benefits are based on terminal salaries), 
and the appropriate discount rate used to compute the present value of the pension obligation. 
 
Measuring The Disclosed Pension Liability 
 
The pension obligation is measured based on the present value of the expected pension benefits; hence the 
importance of the assumed discount rate.  The two obligation measures if interest are generally the projected benefit 
obligation (PBO) and the accumulated benefit obligation (ABO). The projected benefit obligation is the present value 
of all pension benefits earned, both vested and unvested, based upon expected final salaries.  The accumulated benefit 
obligation is the present value of all pension benefits earned, both vested and unvested, based upon current salaries. 
 
On the firms’ balance sheet, the basic evidence of the firms’ pension plan is the “prepaid pension cost” 
(asset) or “accrued pension cost” (liability) account.  This account is simply the cumulative historical total difference 
between the pension expense recorded and the amount contributed to the plan.  If the cumulative pension expense 
recorded to date is greater than the cumulative funding, a liability exists.  If the cumulative pension expense recorded 
to data is less than the cumulative funding, an asset exists.  It is important to note that, due to the accounting 
procedures codified in SFAS 87, it is possible for a pension plan to be severely underfunded (however defined) and 
yet show a “prepaid pension cost” (asset) on their balance sheet. 
T 
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To address the possibility that a firm could have an underfunded pension plan and yet show a prepaid 
pension asset, SFAS 87 also imposes a “minimum liability” requirement on firms.  The “minimum liability” is the 
excess of the firm’s accumulated benefit obligation over its pension plan assets.  If, according to this measure, the 
pension plan is underfunded, the firm must disclose a net pension liability at least equal to the amount of the minimum 
liability.  If the firm already has an “accrued pension liability” at least as great as this minimum, no additional liability 
need be recorded.  If the firm does not have an existing “accrued pension liability” of at least this magnitude they must 
record an “additional pension liability” in order to disclose a net liability at least equal to the required minimum.  If 
the firm has an existing “prepaid pension asset”, they are put in the unenviable position of having to record an 
additional liability great enough to (a) reverse the existing pension asset, and (b) create the required liability. 
 
The illustration below illustrates how the minimum liability requirement could impact firms with different 
pension values: 
     Firm A  Firm B  Firm C 
Accumulated Benefit Obligation  101  100  101 
Pension plan assets   100  100  100 
Minimum liability   1  0  1 
Existing liability (asset)   10  (10)  (10) 
Additional liability required  0  0  11 
 
In the case of “Firm A”, a minimum liability of $1 required.  However, since they already have a $10 
“accrued pension cost” liability on their balance sheet no additional liability is required. 
 
“Firm B” has assets exactly equal to the accumulated benefit obligation; therefore, they have no minimum 
liability requirement and are free to report their $10 prepaid pension asset on the balance sheet. 
 
“Firm C” has an accumulated benefit obligation which is $1greater than their pension plan assets; hence they 
are required to report a net liability of at least $1.  They are currently showing a $10 prepaid pension asset, which 
means they will be required to book an additional $11 liability in order to get their net liability up to the required 
minimum level. 
 
Clearly, this illustration shows that firms in the position of having an existing pension asset on their balance 
sheet have a strong incentive to minimize their accumulated benefit obligation.  Comparing firms B and C in the 
illustration, we see that a $1 decrease in the projected benefit obligation can enable the firm to avoid $11 in additional 
liability charges. 
 
The Effect Of The Choice Of Discount Rate And Existing Research 
 
The discount rate chosen by the firm can impact the firm’s reported results in several ways.  As was noted 
previously, the pension obligation is measured as a present value.  The increase in the present value of the projected 
benefit obligation (the “interest cost” or “settlement cost”) each year is one of the components of pension expense.  
The choice of discount rate therefore affects the annual reported pension expense, tax obligations, and funding 
requirements.  Godwin, et al. (1996) examine this aspect of the relationship.  Blankley and Swanson (1995), Newell, 
et al. (2002), and Asthana (1999) all examine pension assumptions with an eye towards income effects, the effect on 
the projected benefit obligation, and funding requirements. 
 
The effect of discount rate choice on periodic pension expense is ultimately indeterminate.  A higher discount 
rate leads to a lower projected benefit obligation; in the computation of periodic pension expense multiplying the 
higher discount rate by the lower projected benefit obligation will have a varying effect on periodic pension expense 
which is dependent upon the assumed pattern of future cash outflows from the pension plan. 
 
The effect of discount rate choice on the projected benefit obligation itself is an interesting question, although 
for accounting purposes it is relatively unimportant in the short run.  A short-run decrease in the discount rate will 
increase the projected benefit obligation, but this will not appear in the body of the financial statements.  Instead, this 
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“actuarial loss” will be deferred (off the balance sheet) and subject to amortization only if certain future criteria are 
met.  The existing pension asset or liability reported in the body of the financial statements would be unaffected. 
 
The Current Research 
 
In this paper, the effect of the minimum liability reporting requirement on pension discount rate choice will 
be examined.  According to SFAS 87, firms should select a discount rate consistent with the rate at which the 
“pension obligation could effectively be settled”; that is, the rate which could be earned if the firm were to defease the 
obligation by purchasing investment-grade fixed income securities with maturities matching the expected pension 
outflows.  Assuming that the majority of firms with defined benefit pension plans face roughly the same time horizon 
for paying benefits, one would expect the selected discount rates of firms to cluster tightly around some common 
value each year. 
 
In this paper, firms will be segregated based upon whether or not it appears that their choice of discount rate 
affected their required additional liability disclosures.  To accomplish this, information of pension plan assets, the 
accumulated benefit obligation, the existing prepaid or accrued pension cost, and the assumed discount rate was 
collected for 1995 through 1997 for firms with the required data listed in the COMPUSTAT database.  The sample 
period ended in 1997 because the number of firms disclosing accumulated benefit obligation information dropped off 
precipitously after 1997.  Firms which had multiple pension plans had their assets and obligations across plans merged 
into single measures.   
 
First, the firms reported “additional liability” position is determined based upon their reported accumulated 
benefit obligation, their pension plan assets, and their existing prepaid/accrued pension cost amounts.  Firms with an 
additional liability requirement were coded as “1”, while those without an additional liability requirement were coded 
as “0”. 
 
Next, the firms’ reported accumulated benefit obligation measures were restated on a pro-forma basis to 
reflect what the obligation would have been had the firm used the average discount rate for that sample year.  Clearly, 
this is the most difficult aspect of the work to defend.  Unfortunately, there is no publicly available information which 
would allow us to infer the effect of discount rate changes on a firm’s accumulated benefit obligation.  Based on an 
examination of a sample of firms’ 10-K reports, it appears that a one-percentage-point change in the discount rate 
yields a change in the firms’ projected benefit obligation in the range of 5% to 8%.  Given that the projected benefit 
obligations cash flows are more heavily weighted further into the future than are the accumulated benefit obligations’ 
cash flows, the accumulated benefit obligation would be less sensitive to changes in the discount rate.  The 
conservative estimation was made that a one-percentage-point change in the discount rate would yield a 1% change in 
the accumulated benefit obligation.  Under this construct, if a firm used a 7% discount rate and reported an 
accumulated benefit obligation of $100, while the average across all firms was 6%, that firm’s accumulated benefit 
obligation would be increased by 1% from 100 to 101.  If the firm had used a 6.5% discount rate the accumulated 
benefit obligation would be revised upwards from 100 to 100.5. 
 
After recalculating the firms’ accumulated benefit obligation measures, the firms were once again coded as 
“1” for those firms requiring an additional liability accrual, and “0” for those not requiring an additional liability 
accrual.   
 
Finally, firms were coded based on whether or not they moved from the non-additional-liability group based 
on their reported discount rate to the additional-liability group based on use of the sample average discount rate.  The 
coding was as follows: 
 
1:  Firms who move from a non-additional-liability position based on their selected discount rate to an 
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Stated in the null form, the hypothesis would be that firms in “Group 1” did not have significantly higher 
discount rates than those in “Group 0”.  If it is found that the discount rates in “Group 1” firms are significantly higher 
than those in “Group 0” it would suggest that these firms are selecting these higher discount rates in order to avoid the 
accrual of the additional liability measure.  Essentially it is a question of whether firms which can benefit from a 
higher discount rate are in fact selecting a higher discount rate. 
 
Results – 1995 Sample 
 
Based on the data available in the COMPUSTAT data files for 1995, there were 1,090 firms with the 
required data available.  Of this group, only 76 (7%) were in a position to require an additional liability accrual.  The 
average discount rate for the period was 7.418%, with individual firms ranging from a low of 4% to a high of 11%. 
 
After adjusting the accumulated benefit obligations as discussed above, the number of firms which moved 
from a non-additional-liability position to an additional-liability position was 234, or 23% of those who had 
previously not needed to report an additional liability.  The average discount rate for the two groups was compared 
using a simple t-test, with the following results: 
 
  Group 0 Group 1 
Mean 7.334001168 7.723932 
Variance 0.204658563 0.158738 
Observations 856 234 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
t Statistic 12.87344358  
P(T<=t) two-tail 4.14005E-32  
t Critical two-tail 1.965736374  
 
 
Clearly, the firms in “Group 1” selected a substantially higher discount rate.  This suggests that firms which 
would have normally found themselves in a position of needing to accrue an additional liability were able to avoid that 
position by selecting an unusually high discount rate.   
 
Results – 1996 Sample 
 
Based on the data available in the COMPUSTAT data files for 1996, there were 1,129 firms with the 
required data available.  Of this group, only 58 (5%) were in a position to require an additional liability accrual.  The 
average discount rate for the period was 7.559%, with individual firms ranging from a low of 4.5% to a high of 10%. 
 
After adjusting the accumulated benefit obligations as discussed above, the number of firms which moved 
from a non-additional-liability position to an additional-liability position was 210, or 20% of the firms which were 
previously in the no-additional-liability category.  The average discount rate for the two groups was compared using a 
simple t-test, with the following results: 
 
 
  Group 0 Group 1 
Mean 7.4835691 7.8905238 
Variance 0.1538329 0.0372567 
Observations 919 210 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
t statistic -21.91592  
P(T<=t) two-tail 2.638E-80  
t Critical two-tail 1.9635854  
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Results – 1997 Sample 
 
Based on the data available in the COMPUSTAT data files for 1997, there were 1,128 firms with the 
required data available.  Of this group, only 44 (4%) were in a position to require an additional liability accrual.  The 
average discount rate for the period was 7.277%, with individual firms ranging from a low of 4% to a high of 12%. 
 
After adjusting the accumulated benefit obligations as discussed above, the number of firms which moved 
from a non-additional-liability position to an additional-liability position was 210, or 19% of the firms which were 
previously in the no-additional-liability category.  The average discount rate for the two groups was compared using a 
simple t-test, with the following results: 
 
 
  Group 0 Group 1 
Mean 7.194199 7.641429 
Variance 0.163961 0.061133 
Observations 918 210 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
Degrees of freedom 501  
t statistic -20.6354  
P(T<=t) one-tail 3.13E-69  
t Critical one-tail 1.6479  





The evidence presented here clearly suggests that there is a strong association between the discount rates 
firms use to compute their pension obligations and their potential minimum liability accrual concerns.  The small 
number of firms in a reported additional liability position, compared to the large number in such a position based on 
adjusted pro-forma measures, suggests that firms manage these assumptions to avoid being placed in the position of 
requiring an additional liability accrual.  Firms which would be forced to accrue an additional liability if market 
discount rates were used use substantially higher discount rates and hence avoid the need to accrue the additional 
liability. 
 
The greatest methodological weakness in this paper is the reliance on a pro-forma measure of the “true” 
accumulated benefit obligation.  Unfortunately, barring access to the firms actuarial data the true cash flow patterns, 
and the resulting sensitivity to interest rate adjustments, will never be known.  The author believes that the use of an 
extremely conservative adjustment factor (1% change in accumulated benefit obligation for every 1% change in the 
discount rate) mitigates against any overwhelming criticism from this quarter. 
 
A second weakness involves the use of COMPUSTAT data itself.  The pension data, which is reported in 
footnotes to the firms’ financial statements, is apparently not treated with the same care by Standard and Poor’s as is 
data from the body of the financial statements, and is prone to contain erroneous data.  The author has an on-going 
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